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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

VELMA GLADYS YATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER,
a project of Division of
Family and Community Medicine,
University of Utah; UINTAH
COUNTY HOSPITAL; VERNAL DRUG
COMPANY, a Utah corporation;
and GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D.,

Case No.

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-appellant, Velma Gladys Yates, brought this
action to recover damages for personal injuries alleging the
commission of medical malpractice by defendants-respondents.
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Allen B. Sorensen found that appellant
had failed to comply with the notice requirement of 78-14-8,
Utah Code Ann.,

and ordered the appellant's complaint dismissed.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order
dismissing the complaint and the right to have a trial upon the
merits of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the period which began in December of 1975 and
ended in March of 1977, appeilant was a patient of and undergoing
medical treatment from respondent Dr. Gordon Lee Balka and respondent Vernal Family Health Center.

Dr. Balka was, during this

sixteen month period, employed by the Vernal Family Health Center.
In the cause of this treatment, appellant was furnished with an
unwarranted amount of prescriptions and refills (approximately
217) of no less than fourteen different drugs, by Dr. Balka
and other members of the staff of the Vernal Family Health
Center, all of which were dispensed by respondent Vernal Drug
Company.
As a direct result of the negligence in providing
appellant with this enormous quantity of drugs, appellant became
disoriented and incoherent, which disorientation necessitated
her hospitalization in respondent Uintah County Hospital on
March 12, 1977.

After approximately three days of hospitaliza-

tion, due to negligent treatment and supervision of respondent
Uintah County Hospital, appellant began to suffer continual
convulsive seizures which required her transfer and admission
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to Holy Cross Hospital on March 17, 1977.

These seizures were

eventually controlled and on April 6, 1977 appellant was returned to Uintah County Hospital where she remained until her
discharge on April 12, 1977.
Subsequently, upon the stabilization of appellant's
condition and the administration of tests in March of 1978 it
was discovered that as a result of the aforementioned abuse of
drugs and convulsive seizures appellant had suffered permanent
mental disability.

This deterioration of mental capability has

caused appellant to function at a very marginal level in need
of continual close supervision to provide for her basic needs.
On April 7, 1978, pursuant to 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann.,
appellant's husband and attorney executed a notice of intent to
commence a malpractice action which was in the form of a letter
and which was served on respondents Vernal Family Health Center,
Dr. Balka, Vernal Drug Company and Uintah County Hospital on
April 12, 1978.
On July 19, 1978, appellant filed the Complaint which
initiated this action.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT DID IN FACT COMPLY WITH THE
NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION B OF THE
UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT BY
SERVING A LETTER ON EACH RESPONDENT
MORE THAN NINETY DAYS PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF THIS ACTION.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was originally
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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enacted in 1976 and is found at 78-14-1 et seq., Utah Code
Ann.

This Act was amended in several aspects by the Utah

Legislature in 1979.

Although appellant's cause of action

accrued prior to the enactment of these amendments, it is clear
that her cause of action is to be goverened by the Act in its
amended form, since these amendments dealt only with procedural
matters.

Foil v. Ballinger, No. 16071, filed September 19, 1979.

Section 8 of the Act now reads as follows:
"No malpractice action against a health care
provider may be initiated unless and until the
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or
his executor or successor, at least ninety days
prior notice of intent to commence an action.
Such notice shall include a general statement
of the nature of the claim, the persons involved,
~he date, time and place of occurence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant,
the nature of the alleged injuries and other
damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or
affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his
attorney ... "
Since the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is of
recent vintage, there is very little case law in existence to
aid in the interpretation of its notice requirement.

In fact,

no case has been found in which this Court has addressed the
question of what constitutes sufficient compliance with the
requirements of 78-14-8.

For this reason, it is helpful to

look to analogous situations in which notices of claim are
required to be filed prior to the initation of an action.
One such situation is found in Hatch v. Weber County,

-4-
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459 P.2d 436

(Utah 1969).

In that case, plaintiff had served

a notice of claim for attorneys' fees on the county in the form
of a letter to the County Commission, County Clerk, and County
Attorney and defendant contended that no proper claim had been
filed pursuant to 17-15-10, Utah Code Ann.

This Court rejected

the contention that strict compliance with 17-15-10 was necessary
and stated that it was sufficient if the statute was substantially
complied with when such substantial compliance fulfilled the
purposes for which the notice requirement was designed.
Similarly, with regard to various other statutes that
provide for the giving of notice, this Court has also embraced
the doctrine of substantial compliance.

Thus, in State v.

District Court of Salt Lake County, 115 P.2d 913 (Utah 1941),
which case involved an action against the State of Utah for the
disgorgement of an unlawful tax, it was stated that "There must
be substantial compliance with the designated statutory procedure."

Further, in Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v. Morse,

136 P. 965 (Utah 1913), Mr. Justice Frick adopted the doctrine
of substantial compliance citing 29 Cyc. 1117:
"The general rule in respect to notices is
that mere informalities do not vitiate them
so long as they do not mislead, and give the
necessary information to the proper parties."
That strict compliance is not essential to satisfy the
notice requirement of 78-14-8 is further shown by analyzing
those situations in which strict compliance with statutory

-5-
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procedure has been typically required by the Utah courts.
cases requiring a strict and literal compliance with the

Those

statute~

procedure have generally involved a statutorily created right,
such as the right to sue a governmental entity.

For example,

see Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480
(Utah 1975) .

The rationale of requiring strict compliance in

such a situation is that a party who is seeking the benefit of
a statutorily derived right should not be allowed to claim only
the favorable aspects of the statute which confers the right
and to ignore the conditions upon which that right is predicated.
It should be noted, however, that ample authority exists for the
proposition that substantial compliance will suffice even where
the notice of claim requirement arises from a statutorily
created right.

Nelson v. Dunkin, 419 P.2d 984 (Wash. 1966);

Jorstad v. City of Lewiston, 456 P.2d 766 (Idaho 1969).
Regardless of the split of authority as to whether
strict compliance is required when attempting to enforce a
statutorily created right, it is clear that the instant case
is not of the type of cases in which the Utah courts have
required strict compliance with the procedural requirements.
That is, the right to sue for malpractice does not arise as
the result of a statutory enactment waiving immunity subject
to stated conditions, but rather, it is a long standing common
law right.

Further, it is a well settled principle that the

Utah statutes are to be liberally construed to effect their
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objectives and to promote justice.

68-3-2, Utah Code Anno.

Such a policy of liberality requires that a plaintiff need
only manifest substantial compliance with the notice requirement
of 78-14-8.
An examination of the notice of intent provided in
the instant case shows that appellant did substantially comply
with 78-14-8.

This notice was in letter form, dated April 7,

1978, and executed by appellant's attorney.

Said notice was

timely served within the statute of limitations provided for by
78-14-4 on respondents Vernal Family Health Center, Dr. Lee
Balka, Vernal Drug company, and Uintah County Hospital on
April 12, 1978.

Appellant's complaint was not filed until

July 19, 1978--a period of ninety-eight days subsequent to the
service of the notice of intent on each defendant.
The notice served on respondents contained the following language:
Pursuant to 78-14-8, UCA, notice is herewith
given that Marzine Yates, husband of Velma Gladys
Yates, potentially is asserting and claiming and
~ornrnence a civil action for damages arising
out of possible negligent prescribing, negligent
dispensing of drugs or other forms of prescribed
medicine, and negligent hospitalization and
treatment of his wife.
In compliance with the
aforesaid section of the Utah Code, it is believed
and will be alleged in the event a civil action is
commenced that from approximately March 1976 until
March 1978, plaintiff's wife received prescriptions
from the Vernal Drug Company believed to have been
prescribed by Dr. Lee Balka in his official capacity as a partner or responsibl~ agent of.th~
Vernal Family Health Center, which prescriptions,
in combination of use or separate, were dispensed
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in an excessive amount which has resulted in
permanent mental damage to claimant's wife.
It is further believed that as a result of
the prolonged excess abuse of the precription
medication, the seizure and subsequent coma
which claimant's wife suffered approximately
one year ago were possibly the result of neglience.
(emphasis added)
Section 8 of the Health Care Malpractice Act states
that the following information be contained in the notice of
intent:
1)

a general statement of the nature of the claim,

2)

the persons involved,

3)

the date, time and place of occurence,

4)

the circumstances thereof,

5)

specific allegations of misconduct, and

6)

the nature of the alleged injuries.

A reading of the letter served by appellant indicates that
appellant did provide respondents with the above information and
substantially complied with 78-14-8 in all aspects.

That is,

the claim was identified as one involving negligent prescribing
and dispensing of drugs and negligent hospitalization, the
appellant and respondents were identified, the time of occurence
was set during the period from March 1976 to March 1978 and
specific misconduct was alleged in the excessive supplying of
appellant with prescriptions resulting in seizures and injuries
consisting of permanent mental damage.

This information suffi-

ciently apprised respondents of appellant's claim and substan-
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tially complied with the provisions of 78-14-8.
POINT II
RESPONDENTS RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF
APPELLANT'S INTENT TO COMMENCE A MALPRACTICE ACTION SUFFICIENT TO FULLY
SATISFY THE PURPOSES COMTEMPLATED BY
THE LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING SECTION 8
OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT.
Not only did appellant comply with the provisions of
78-14-8, but her notice further satisfied the intend underlying
the enactment of that section.

In order to correctly interpret

the notice requirement of 78-14-8, the legislative intent
underlying the Health Care Malpractice Act must be ascertained,
since these provisions must be construed so as to accomplish
the purposes of the Act.

Section 2 of this Act states the

purposes of the Act as follows:
... to provide a reasonable time in which actions
may be commenced against health care providers
while limiting that time to a specific period
for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes
to expedite early evaluation and settlement
of claims.
It is apparent that 78-14-8 was adopted merely as a
procedural device to insure that potential defendants receive
actual notice of a claim against them, and have an opportunity
to resolve that claim prior to the filing of a complaint.

This

is conclusively shown by reference to the "Report of the
Activity and Recommendations of the Social Services Study
Committee" of December 17, 1975 which is found in Medical

-9-
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Malpractice Insurance Problems, Report to the 4lst Legislative,
Research Report No. 2, January 1976, Office of Legislative
Research State of Utah Recommendation 9 of that report established
the notice requirement now found at 78-14-8 and states:
The Committee feels that the requirement
that the plaintiff give notice of action prior
to suit will enhance the possibility of a
settlement of the claim before suit.
Thus, the Legislature intended the notice requirement
of 78-14-8 to provide potential medical malpractice defendants
the opportunity to evaluate claims and to engage in settlement
negotiations prior to the filing of a suit.

The intent was not

to create a technical stumbling block for unwary plaintiffs,
but only to provide a time period of ninety days within which
settlement negotiations could be pursued.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that each
respondentreceived actual notice of the claim and had ample
opportunities to investigate the claim and engage in settlement
proceedings prior to the initiation of litigation.

In fact,

appellant's notice was served with dispatch after the discovery
in March of 1978 of appellant's mental disabilities, which
promptness enabled respondents to make an early investigation
and evaluation of the claim while the matter was of recent
memory and while witnesses were still readily available.

That

is, appellant has accorded respondents with every right that
the legislature intended she should.
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To adopt a construction of 78-14-8 requiring strict
and technical compliance, in the fact of actual knowledge by
respondents of the type of information designed to be provided
by 78-14-8, would be an obvious injustice.

Further, such a

reading would thrwart the purpose of the Act by erecting a
mere technical requirement serving to increase uncertainity,
which is inimical to the facilitation of reasonable and
accurate calculation of premiums.

Form should not be held

in violate at the cost of substance, especially where respondents
had actual notice of the claim, which actual notice provided
respondents with the information and settlement period which
78-14-8 was intended to provide.
POINT III
IN ADDITION TO COMPLIANCE WITH 78-14-8,
APPELLANT SATISFIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF
ALL OTHER APPLICABLE STATUTE'S PROVIDING
FOR THE FILING OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM.
As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that the
only other such applicable statute providing for the filing of
a notice of claim is found in the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann., at Section 11.

On its

fact, 17-15-10, Utah Code Ann., which requires the filing of
claims against the county with the County Auditor, appears to
be applicable.

A closer examination, however, reveals that

such a contention cannot stand.
17-15-10 was first enacted in the Revised Statutes,
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1898, while the Utah Governmental Irrununity Act was enacted in
1965.

Prior to this statutory abrogration of irrununity for

actions sounding in negligence by governmental entities in
1965, a cause of action founded in this abrogation of irrununity
is to be governed solely by the procedure enunicated in the
statute which waives the irrununity.

Such a conclusion is con-

sistent with the role that when two statutes relate to the same
general statute to govern those situations within the scope of
its coverage.

Rarrunell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977).

The requirement of a filing of a notice pursuant to
the Utah Governmental Irrununity Act is found at 63-30-11 as
follows:
Any person having a claim for injury to
person or property against a governmental
entity or its employee shall, before maintaining an action under this act, file a
written notice of claim with such entity
for appropriate relief including money
damages.
The notice of claim shall set
forth a brief statement of the facts and
the nature of the claim asserted, shall be
signed by the person making the claim or
such person's agent, attorney, parent or
legal guardian, and shall be directed and
delivered to the responsible governmental
entity within the time prescribed in Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable.
An examination of the notice served on respondents on April 12,
1978,

(see text of this notice on page 7) shows compliance with

the above quoted section.

That is, said notice was in writing,

was served prior to the filing of this action, contained a
brief statement of the facts and the nature of the claim,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was signed by appellant's attorney and husband, and, as will
be discussed below, was timely filed.

Further, the notice

furnished by appellant fully satisfied the purposes for which
the notice of claim statue was enacted.

These purposes were

identified by Mr. Justice Maughn in his dissenting opinion in
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480 (1975):
The purpose of statutes requiring the presentation of claims to political subdivisions, prior
to filing a suit, is in furtherance of public
policy to present unnecessary litigation. The
purpose of notice provisions is to afford the
political subdivision an opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is of recent
memory, witnesses are yet available, conditions
have not materially changed and to determine if
there is liability, and if there is, the extent
of it.
Mr. Justice Maughn also rejected the contention that strict
compliance with the notice of claim statute was required when
defendant was provided with all of the opportunities that the
statute was intended to provide.
With regard to the question whether appellant's
notice of claim was timely filed, Section 63-30-13 provides
that claims against a political subdivision are barred unless
filed within one year after the cause of action arises.

Thus,

it is crucial to make the determination as to when appellant's
cause of action arose.

This Court recently held in Foil v.

Ballinger, No. 16071, filed September 19, 1979, that in a
medical malpractice action, the statute of limitations does
not begin to run "until the injured person knew or should have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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known that he had sustained an injury and that the injury was
caused by negligent action."

Similarly, in the context of a

notice of claim filed against a county pursuant to 63-30-13,
Utah Code Ann., this Court held that no cause of action arose
·until plaintiff actually discovered the cause of the damage to
his property.

Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (1978).

Both of these decisions relied on Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d
435 (Utah 1968), wherein this Court stated:
It seems somewhat incongruous that an injured
person must commence a malpractice action prior
to the time he knew, or reasonably should have
known, of his injury and right of action.
Thus, appellant's cause of action could not have
arisen until appellant had discovered the injury and that such
injury was caused by negligent conduct.

The earliest possible

date that this discovery could have occurred would have been
on April 12, 1977, the date of appellant's release from Uintah
County Hospital.

It is much more likely, however, that the

cause of action did not arise until March of 1978, after
appellant's condition had stabilized and examination revealed
permanant mental disability.

In any event, since the notice

of claim was served on April 12, 1978, such complaint was
timely--that is, the earliest date on which the one year period
provided by 63-30-13 could have run was April 13, 1978.
Regardless of whether appellant's claim was filed
within one year of the accrual of her cause of action, appellant',
mental disability tolled the running of the one year filing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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period.

Section 78-12-36 states:
If a person entitled to bring an action, otherthan for the recovery of a real property, is at
the time the cause of action accrued, either:
(1)
Under the age of majority; or,
(2)
Mentally incompetent and without a
legal guardian, or,
(3)
Imprisoned on a criminal charge ...
The time such disability is not a part of the
time limited for the commencement of the action.

This provision was before the court in the context of the notice
provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act in Scott v.
School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 746 (1977)
In that case, Mr. Justice Hall stated:
Notwithstanding the prior pronouncements of
this court, a minor claimant is justly entitled
to the protection afforded by said Section
78-12-36(1), UCA, 1953, in all cases, including
notice requirements of the type contained in the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. To hold otherwise is a denial of due process and equal protection.
Additionally, Section 63-30-11 provides that if the claimant
is a minor or mentally incompetent, or imprisoned at the time
that the cause of action accrued, then the court may extend
the time for service of the notice of claim.
Thus, even though it appears that appellant's notice
was filed within one year of the accrual of her cause of action,
had it not been so timely filed,

the tolling provisions of

78-12-36, Utah Code Ann. and 63-30-11, Utah Code Ann., would
have prevented the running of the one year notice period due to
appellant's mental disability.

-15-
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POINT IV
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIRED BY SECTION
63-30-11, UTAH CODE ANN. IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS A RESULT OF ITS DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION.
The notice provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act have the effect of dividing all tort-feasors into
classes of tort-feasons:
1)

private tort-feasors to whom no notice of claim

is required, and
2)

governmental tort-feasors to whom such notice is

required.
The principle of equal protection, guaranteed by both the Utah
and United States constitutions, does not require equal treatment in law of things factually different, but it does, however,
require that those similarly situated be similarily treated.
Thus, in State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920 (1938)

this Court

stated:
It is only where some persons or transactions
excluded from the operation of the law are as
to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class from those included in its operation
that the law is discriminatory in the sense of
being arbitrary and unconstitutional.
If a
reasonable basis to differentiate those included
from those excluded from its operation can be
found, it must be held constitutional ...
No such reasonable basis exists in the instant case to justify
the special procedural treatment afforded governmental tortfeasors that is not provided to all other tort-feasors.
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That

Legislature intended governmental and private tort-feasors to
be on equal footing is clearly manifested by a reading of 63-30-4,
Utah Code Ann. :
" ... Wherein immunity from suit is waived
by this act, consent to be sued is granted
and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person."
Since express statutory language negates any possible rational
basis for the differentiation between private and governmental
tort-feasors, the requirement of 63-30-11, Utah Code Ann. providing for the filing of a notice of claim with a governmental tortfeasor prior to maintaining an action is a denial of equal protection.

Reich v. State Highway Dept., 194 N.W.2d 700 (Mich. 1972);

Turner v. Staggs, 510 P.2d 879

(Nev. 1973).

POINT V
THE NOTICE OF INTENT REQUIRED BY 78-14-8,
UTAH CODE ANN., IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
VIOLATES ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26, ARTICLE I,
SECTION 24 AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 2 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
Although this Court recently held in McGuire v. University
of Utah Medical Center, et al., No. 15984, filed November 1, 1979,
that the 1979 amendments to the Health Care Malpractice Act did
not constitute special legislation, it has yet to rule as to whether Section 78-14-8, Utah Code Ann., does constitute special
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legislation.

Article VI, Section 26 of the Utah Constitution

provides that "No private or special law shall be enacted where
a general law can be applicable."

The distinction as to what

constitutes a special law and what constitutes a general law
was drawn in State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414 (Utah 1939), where the
court defined general laws as:
"Laws which apply to and operate uniformly upon
all members of any class of persons, places, or
things requiring legislation peculiar to themselves in the matters covered by the laws in
question •.. "
and special laws as:
" ..• such as relates either to particular persons,
places, or things, or to persons, places, or things
which, though not particularized, are separated
by any method of selection from the whole class
to which the law might, but for such legislation,
be applied ..• "
Thus, a law is a special law if it imposes particular disabilities or conditions upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected
from the general body of those who stand in the same relation
to the subject of the law.

In this case, 78-14-8 constitutes

special legislation in that it requires a different and more
stringent procedure for tort claimants whose injury arises from
the acts or omissions of a health care provider than is required
of tort claimants who are injured by nonhealth care providers.
No justification exists for singling out
and providing it with procedural
groups.

t..~e

medical profession

protection not afforded other

Certainly other professional groups have as great a

need for procedural safeguards as does the medical profession.
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1

On the other hand, should the Court find that the
statute is a general law, then it violates Article I, Section
24 of the Utah Constitution.

That section states:

of a general nature shall have uniform operation."

"All laws
This notice

provision does not have uniform application to all plaintiffs
similarily situated and there is no rational basis for this
desparate treatment of classes.
Both of the above cited constitutional sections are
closely related to the question of equal protection.

State

Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297
(Utah 1978).

Traditionally, a two-tiered analysis has been

employed in the area of equal protection.

That is, a standard

of strict scrutiny will be employed when the statute contains
a suspect class or impinges on a fundamental right.

Under

this standard, the statute will be upheld only if it furthers
a compelling state interest.

All other classification

schemes have traditionally been tested under the rational
basis standard which requires the validation of the classification scheme if there is any conceivable justification
for its existence.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has begun
to adopt an intermediate level of scrutiny which has been
termed the "means scrutiny standard".

Under this standard,

the inquiry is whether the classification substantially
furthers the purpose for the classification.

In Jones v. State
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Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399 (Idaho 1976), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that an equal protection challenge to
medical malpractice legislation is to be measured by the
means scrutiny test.

Thus, the constitutionality of the pro-

visions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act should be
gauged either by the means scrutiny test of Jones or by the
higher strict scrutiny standard since the right of access to
the courts is a fundamental right.

Utah Constitution,

Article I, Section 11; State ex-rel Schneider v. Liggett,
576 P.2d 221 (Kan. 1978).
For the notice provision of 78-14-8 to stand under
either the strict scrutiny or means scrutiny standards, it
must be shown that a medical malpractice crisis does in
fact exist in Utah, that a classification based upon the
lines of health care providers and non-health care providers
is not arbitary, and that the legislation does in fact reduce
the number and amount of medical malpractice awards.

Absent

such a showing, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act must
be delcared unconstitutional as violative of equal protection.
CONCLUSION
Appellant complied with the applicable notice of
claim provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Furthermore, Section

63-30-11 is unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection
and Section 78-14-8 is unconstitutional as violative of equal
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protection

and Article VI, Section 26 and Article I, Section

24 of the Utah Constitution.
For these reasons, the trial court erred in granting
respondents' Motion to Dismiss appellant's complaint.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

__b__

day of December,

1979.
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